Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Wilderness Building Systems Inc., And Kerry R. Hubble v. Charles
H. Chapman And Edythe S. Chapman : Brief of Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.John Walsh; Attorney for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, No. 19009 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4547

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-----------0000000-----------

WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS INC., and KERRY R.
HUBBLE,
Plaintiffs
Appellants,
vs.

CHARLES H. CHAPMAN and
EDYTHE S. CHAPMAN,
Defendants
Respondents.

-------------0000000-------------

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
PRESIDING
JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANTS
SUITE 202 COVE POINT PLAZA
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD
SALT LAKE CITY, UTA.H
84109
J. KENT HOLLAND
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENTS
623 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
841

°F I L E D
JUN

;i

i983

q____---

0...__Q

Cler!:. Su;irm:o Comt, Ut.:l:i

IN Tl-lE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-----------0000000-----------

"II.DERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS INC., and KERRY R.
HUBBLE,
Plaintiffs
Appellants,
vs.

CHARLES H. CHAPMAN and
EDYTHE S. CHAPMAN,
Defendants
Respondents.

-------------0000000-------------

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HOtlORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
PRESIDING
JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANTS
SUITE 202 COVE POINT PLAZA
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84109
J. KENT HOLLAND
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENTS
623 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

TABLE OF CASES
Chanev, 366 P.2d 607, Utah, 1961.

13

IJnited States, for the Use and Benefit of Holley,
Circuit) 154 F.2d 707.

13

1,.1i

•s

,

1,

,

s

DisLributing, Inc. vs. Perry, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412.

-- pffi 375, Utah, 1966.

.

15

f1llmore Products, Inc., vs. Western States, 561 P.2d 687 . 10
Utah ,-l977.
Lignel 1 vs.

593 P. 2d 800, Utah, 1979
Gould, 281 P.2d 524, Cal..

Utah.

9, 10

. .

12

Corp. v. McGlynn Garrnaker Company, 567 P.2d 1110,

:Ioselv vs. Johnson,

22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149, Utah

9
9' 12

:-rotivated Manap:ernent International vs. Finney, 604 P. 2d
467, Utah, 1979

14' 16

'latt vs. Locke, 358 P.2d 95, Utah, 1961

13

l.Thi_pple vs.

12

Fuller, 299 P.2d 837, Utah, 1956
TABLE OF STATUTES

53-23-2 (5) UCA

7

SS-23-1 UCA

8
TABLE OF TREATISES

C0rhin on Contracts, Vol.

6A, Sec.

-i-

1512

. . . . . . . . 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I ,\l,LE
LJ

ITI.
VI.
V.

VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.
X.

OF CONTENTS

ii

TAf\LE OF CASES

i

TAR LE OF STATUTES

i

TABLE OF TREATISES

i

STATEMEN'!' OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

PELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STA"'FMENT OF THE FACTS

2

STATEMENT OF THE LAW

7

ARGUMENT ONE

7

ARGUMENT TWO

9

ARGw-IBNT THREE

11

ARGUMENT FOUR

14

SUMMARY

17

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

19

- i ; -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-------------0000000------------L11LRNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS
INC
and KERRY R. HUBBLE,

'.JI

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19009

CHARLES H. CHAPMAN and
EDYTHE S. CHAPMAN,
Defendants-Respondents.
-------------00000000000----------------BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
-------------00000000000----------------STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Directed Verdict, entered
against the Plaintiff-Appellant, after a jury had awarded the
Plaintiff-Appellant $7,250.00.
jury of three theories:

(1)

This

was tried before the

lien foreclosure, (2) breach of

contract and (3) quantum merit.

The jury verdict was set

aside on the basis that the Plaintiff-Appellant was not a
licensed contractor at the time of the contract between the
parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that the
be reversed and remanded with instruction to enter

judgment for the Plaintiff against the Dc,fe>nda11t amount of $7,250.00, along with interests and

c0,l:·

attorneys fees in the sum of $2,500.00.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early spring of 1981, the Plaintitf auven·
the sale of a "package home".

This packaged home was a ''·'·

cabin kit and consisted of the logs and certain limited curstruction materials.
The Defendants answered the advertisement, put mcn 2
down for the same, and subsequently purchased the same ou:r':
During the months of May and June of 1981, the Defec:frequented the place of business of the Plaintiff to learn
about the construction of said kit.

Then, at or aboul the

first of June, the parties entered into an agreement fot
erection of said kit as follows:

(1)

the parties agreed::

the purchase of additional materials that were not included
in the kit.

Note Exhibit 4-P and (2)

the Plaintiff agreerl ·

erect the kit, which consisted of these additional material·
and the basic logs.

Note Exhibit 5-P.

It should be no'ec

the Defendant was ;;oing to do all of the plumbing, electr'.,·:.
work, insulation, water proofing, shingles, and all ·"' t'ic
terior work, and the Plaintiff was only going to do

1

t it

': ..

work.
At the time of trial, the Plaintiff and his

Flll·

testified that it was agreed at the time of the contracr
the Plaintiff would work for the Defendant, and the Dd•c

,

1

1."111
1

11

:ot

lie

general contractor and building his own home.

denied the same at trial and testified that he

I

that the Plaintiff was not licensed when the work

was tenninated.
The Plaintiff worked through the surmner to erect the
Defendants'

kit.

Through the course of the erection there

were various change orders and finally in the month of August,
the Defendant requested that the Plaintiff just put the roof
on and be done.
At this time,

the Defendants engaged an attorney who

wrote the Plaintiff a letter, indicating that since the
Plaintiff was not licensed he could not collect for the work
that he had done.

The letter further stated that if the Plain-

tiff would leave the job and file no liens then the Defendant
would take no action against the Plaintiff for contracting without a license.

Note Exhibit 18-P.

However, Plaintiff demanded payment and the Defendants
refused the same.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed two liens,

(1) for

additional materials based upon the contract, Exhibit 4-P,
and the change orders along the way, and (2) for labor.
Note Exhibit 16-P for materials and 15-P for labor.
Plaintiff filed suit to foreclose the said liens and
three causes of action:
(2)

(1)

foreclose the liens,

damages stemming from breach of contract and (3) money

damages from unjust enrichment.
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Defendants answered and counterclaim on th 0 h 1 .
of a refund as well as for faulty workmanship, ead•
on the fact that the Plaintiff was not licensed.
After discovery was completed,

the Defendants fi;t.

a Motion for Partial Surnrnary Judgment, on the basis that
Plaintiff was not a licensed contractor and hence his cor.c:.
and particularly the one with the Defendants are void.

'!Jc

was heard on November 15, 1982, before the Honorable Homer'
Wilkinson, District Judge, just three days before trial.
According to the minute entry on page 58 of the file:
'tourt finds that questions of fact have been raised that
material thereby denies the motion and indicates that trial
will take 2 days, it now being a jury trial, and it will pr:
ceed on schedule."
The trial proceeded as scheduled and the Plaintift
on evidence to substantial the following:

(1)

That the De·

fendants were as protected from inept and financially irresr:
sible builders as they otherwise would have been if Plaintc'.'.
had in fact been licensed.

(2)

That the Defendants knew or'

have known that the Plaintiff was not licensed and still wer·
ahead and did business with him, and reaped the benefit Jf

i

reduced price for his services because he was not a gener3'.
tractor.

(3) That there was a licensed contractor on locD

who oversaw all the construction of the Defendants cat:1r·
(4)

That the Defendants were the sole owners of the pry.

and that the cabin was being built by the Defendants anr! i:,
it was for their oFn personal use.

_ /,

-

U11rin? the course of the trial, Court and counsel
, ,, rl1:i1•1bers and reviewed and revised the jury instructions.
, '"·111·' hours of the same, Judge Wilkinson drafted jury
1 ,,,t,uclion

1!11, which reads as follows:

You are instructed that the contract between the
parties is enforceable if you find that all work
was performed by a licensed contractor or the work
done by defendants employees was completely supervised by a licensed contractor.
Note the proposed jury instruction, as found on
page 67, of the record, with the accompanying notation thereon,
"Given in substance H.F.W."
After the Plaintiff had put on his case, as set forth
above, he rested and the Defendants made a motion for a directed
verdict, which the Court took under advisement.
Defendants thereafter, presented their case and the
matter was submitted to the jury.
Along with the regular jury instructions, a special
verdict was submitted to and responded to by the jury as follows:
(1)
Do you find that the work done by the Plaintiff
on the Defendants' cabin was performed by a licensed
contractor or that the work of the employees was completely supervised by a licensed contractor?

ANSWER:

NO

(2)
Do you find that the Plaintiff materially complied
with the plans, labor contract, material contract, and
mutually agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and the
Defendant?

ANSWER:

-5-

NO

(3)
If your answer to question (1) and ( 1 1 1 yes then state what sum if anv the Plaint i Ii - 1
entitled to recover for labor performeu dl1•i
supplied.
SUM
(4)
If your answer to Question 2 was no then stac"
what sum if any the Defendant is entitled to recu\I(
for Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Plaine''.
plans, labor contract, material contract, and iM.:cJa ..
agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and

SUM $

Dated this (19th) day of November, 1982

(6:50 P.M.)
(Melvin A. Jensen)
JURY FOREPERSON
While the jury was deliberating, Court and Counsel
agreed that a reasonable attorneys fee, no matter who pre··ai was the sum of $2,500.00.
Several days later, Defendants' Counsel noticed

11r

his Motion for a Directed Verdict and the same was heard
the Honorable Homer F. T.Jilkinson, District Judge, on Decemcc'.
1982.
The bottom of the minute entry reads as follows
Court indicates that the defense at the time of
trial when Plaintiff rested made a motion to dismi"
and the Court took motion under advisement. Cour'.
feels the question of whether the Plaintiff was a
general contractor or not was a matter of lav an 1
instructions given to the jury were not appropri
Court finds that the Plaintiff was not a ?enPr '
tractor and not entitled to recover and
'
case indicating the jury ruled on the counter -c'
and it's (sic) verdict will stand.
From this order, the Plaintiff appeals, and subm 1 · '
that the matter should be reversed and sent back to the J;-

,ir

1

1

L'

enter judgment against the Defendants-Respondents

'"""mt of $7,250.00 plus interests and costs, and an
,,

in the sum of $2,500.00
In the alternative, Plaintiff submits that the matter

ue

remanded to the District Court with instructions to retry

the matter with corrected jury instructions, so the Plaintiff
can assert his claims for the total $9,272.45.
STATEMENT OF THE LAW
ARGUMENT ONE
PLAINTIFF CAN COLLECT FOR BOTH LABOR AND MATERIALS
WHEN HE SUPPLIES THE SAME TO AN OWNER BUILDING HIS
OWN HOME FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL USE.
In the facts of this case, the Plaintiff testified
that he had several conversations with the Defendant Charles
Chapman, to the effect that Plaintiff was not a licensed contractor, but he could work for the Defendant and the Defendant
could build his o•m home himself without be a general contractor.
According to the building permit for the cabin, the
same was taken out and signed for by the Defendant.

Note Ex.

28-D
While it is true that the Defendant denied any such
conversations and concommitantly any such agreement, Appellant
s:1bmits that the matter should have been submitted to the jury.
According to 58-23-2(5), Utah Code Annotated as amended
i 11

l

"Sole owners of property building structures thereon

for their own use." are exempted from the statute requiring
a contractors license.
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Then in 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated as amende,1
the legislature set forth what would be considered

de

facia evidence of one acting in the capacity of a contra
Evidence of the securing of any construction or c
permit from a governmental agency .
. shall be ,
in any court of the State of Utah as prima facia
of engaging in the business or acting in the capa,,
a contractor.
Hence, in the facts before this Court, the Plaint 1
asserts that Defendants agreed to be the general contractcr
and that he the Plaintiff would work for him, and that as

d

result the permit for the construction of the cabin was ta(,
out by the Defendant.
Consistent herewith, the Plaintiff submitted
lowing jury instruction:

(Note page 69 in the record)

You are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be
licensed and the contract between the parties is
enforceable if you find all of the following (1)
Defendants were the sole owners of the property, r:
the Defendants were building the cabin on the said
property and (3) the cabin was for the Defendants
own use.
(Denied H. F. W.)
Appellant submits that this is error.

Surely, as;,

express in the statute, a person can build his own home wit
being a licensed contractor.

It may not be wise for him

the same, but that is up to the legislature, and its exprv
provision for the same surely was no oversight
Respondent may contend that Defendant eouallv

dt=·1

the existence of such an arrangement, but that only raise

l

,,p

a question of fact which should have been submitted

ARGUMENT TFO
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR CAN STILL COLLECT FOR BOTH
HIS LABOR AND MATERIALS WHEN THE OWNERS ARE OTHERWISE
PROTECTED FROM INEPT AND FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE
BUILDERS.
According to the testimony before the lower Court,
the Plaintiff was to erect the log cabin kit and the Defendant
was to do all of the additional work.

ie: plumbing, electrical,

shingles, water proofing, insulating, all interior work, etc.
Essentially, the Plaintiff was to do the heavy work
and the Defendant was to do the technical work.
As a result, Plaintiff submits that it is hard to
imagine someone embarking on the same without having a certain
degree of both knowledge and expertise.
In the case of Lignell vs. Berg, 593 P.2d 800,

(Utah)

1979, at page 805, the Supreme Court stated that the statute

requiring individuals to be licensed was intended to protect
the public.
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the
status of unlicensed contractors, and has persistently
construed the cited statute as having been designed to
protect the public and consequently to bar recovery by
unlicensed contractors for services rendered under their
contracts.
The most recent Utah cases so holding are
Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149, and
Meridian Cor v. McGl n Garmaker Com any, Utah, 567
P.
T e rationa e o t ose cases is, however,
that the party from whom the contractor seeks to recover
is in the class the legislature intended to protect.
A litigant is not a member of that class if the required

_Q_

l;'rotec t ion (i.e. , against ineEi._.and f inane i a 11
irresponsible builders) is in fact afforded
another means.
(emphasis added)
In the facts before the Court, the "financiallv ir·
sible" element, Appellant submits,

is not applicable.

The

Defendant was the one purchasing all of the materials
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was not to engage any subcontractoro

nor materialmen, nor any laborers outside his own crews
It should be noted that payment for labor, etc.,
due after performance of the contract, hence, no exposure t·
the Defendants financially because they could withhold pa:nry
until the Plaintiff had complied with the contract.
Hence, any material was to be paid for by the Defer.:.
pursuant to the agreement, as well as any additional costs
subcontractors or laborors which the Defendant would havr
engaged independant of the Plaintiff.

So the Plaintiff be:c

licensed or not licensed would have had no effect on the
Therefore Plaintiff-Appellant submits that the only
criteria is the "inept builders" criteria.
In the Lignell, supra, case however, the Court co'1c.
that because of the knowledge and expertise of the ovner' ·
were not in the class of those to be protected.

Hence,

tl•

Court allowed recovery.
Note significantly, the case of Fillmore
vs. Western States, 561 P.2d 687, Utah, 1977, which holds
when an individual engages one who he knows is not 1 icen'":
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'r"d

, l;

H,';l r

k11t•wlE:Clgc,

for him,

he can not thereafter assert that he can

from a valid debt, when the same was incurred with his
request and approval, and moreover his experience.

So it is in this case, the Defendant-Respondent was
to do all of the technical work both inside and out of his cabin.

The Plaintiff was to do only the heavy work for the elderly
couple, and the balance was to be completed by them.
Plaintiff submits that because the Defendants were not
members of the class intended to be protected by the statute
requiring individuals to be license contractors, they are preeluded from asserting that Plaintiff can not collect a just
debt because he was in fact not licensed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff submitted a jury instruction
involving the same, as noted on page 68 in the record.
You are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be
licensed and the contract between the parties is
enforceable if you find that the Defendants were
as protected from inept and financially irresponsible
builders, as they otherwise would have been if Mr.
Hubble had in fact been licensed.
(Denied H.F.W.)
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that whether the Defendants

Nere protected from inept and financially irresponsible builders,
was a question of fact, and therefore should have been submitted
r0 the jurv.

ARGUMENT THREE
THERE IS NO MECHANICAL RDLE DECLARING ALL CONTRACTS
BY UNLICENSED CONTRACTORS VOID AND THE PENALTY SHOULD
FIT THE OFFENSE.

-11-

The Utah Supreme Court has stated more recent!
the provision in the Utah Code Annotated requiring inJi
contracting to be licensed, should not be applied mech;-ini·
to allow unjust enrichment.
In Mosley vs. Johnson.

Chief Justice CrocL:e·

in his dissenting opinion states on page 154:
In reference to this rule, Corbin on Contracts, 1.·o:
Sec. 1512, observes that the rule which precludes .
covery by one unlicensed to perform a particular
should not be arbitrarily applied and that:

*'"'"**id, even in these cases enforecment of the
bargains is not always denied him.
The statute ma·: clearly for protection against fraud and
but in very many cases the statute breaker is neit>,
fraudulent nor incompetent.
He may have rendered e
lent service or delivered goods of the highest qua:.
his non-comoliance with the statute seems nearlv har
and the real defrauder seems to be the defendanL
enriching himself at the plaintiff's expense. Alt 1.•
many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable n;I,
they have not made one in the present instances.
re uires that the enalt should fit the crime'
justice an soun
o not a wa s re uire"'tl1e.
orcement o
icensing statutes y arge
goinh not to the state but to repudiating defendan'..
(emp asis original)

anr

Also, in WhiDple vs. Fuller, 299 P.

2d 837, Utah,

the Court stated on pages 838 and 839:
For the appellant to escape liability on "the fail
to be licensed theory" would subvert the the.Jr·
As the California court said in Matchett vs' c:),_il
P.2d 524, at page 529.
-1, '' '" recovery can be had uµon the contract in 1..
absence of a license when eauity and good cnnsc
dictate such relief as an alternative to a j
which would convert a law intended "for the Sci
protection of the public" into "an unwarranted
for the avoidance of a just obligation."
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'-

It was observed bv the Federal Circuit Court for the
Tenth Circuit in
our licensing statute:
(·leither these statutory provisions nor any others
called to our attention provide in express language
that a contract employing an unlicensed contractor to
perform services falling within the field of his trade
shall be unenforceable * * *
Note Dow vs. United States, for the Use and Benefit of
154 F.2d 710.
Note also Butterfield vs. Chaney, 366 P.2d 607, Utah,

1961 and Platt vs. Locke, 358 P.2d 95, Utah, 1961.
Even assuming that the Plaintiff had no agreement about
the Defendant acting as his own contractor, according to the
facts before this Court, the Defendant knew or should have known
that Plaintiff was not licensed and still went ahead and did
business with him.
Consistent with the testimony of the Plaintiff, Exhibit
5-P, states before itemizing the labor to be performed:
Wilderness Building Systems proposes to perform
all labor as necessary to complete the following
by experienced or licensed personnel in good
workmanlike manner.
As a result, Plaintiff submitted the following jury
instruction as found on page 70 of the record:
Vou are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be
licensed and the contract between the parties is
enforceable if vou find that the Defendants knew or
should have knoivn that the Plaintiff was not licensed
and still went ahead and did business with him.
(Denied H.F.W.)
Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that it is hard to
i!ll.1gine a more unfair and unjust situation than where an
Lndivirlual knows that he is engaging the services of one who

-13-

is not licensed, and reaps the benefit of a lower cu•!
for so doing, and then when the work is completed he
pay for the same on the basis that the individual was

r1,
0 ,1

licensed.
Again, whether the Defendant-Respondent knew that
Plaintiff was licensed or not was a question of fact, whic·
should have been submitted to the jury.
ARGUMENT FOUR
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR CAN COLLECT FOR BOTH LABOR
AND M.ATERIALS IF THE WORK IS COMPLETELY SUPERVISED
BY A LICENSED CONTRACTOR.
In the case of Motivated Management International·

Finney, 604 P. 2d 467, Utah, 1979, the Utah Supreme Court··
faced with a set of facts which Counsel submits are uniquEl
similar to the case at bar.
In that case, the Plaintiff was se 11 ing a "package(
home".

Plaintiff was doing the rough framing.

to act as his own contractor.

Defendant

A licensed contractor overs2

the work of the Plaintiff and was paid by the Plaintiff
Plaintiff supplied the packaged home.

Defendant received

labor at a reduced price because he did not have to pav a
contractor to do the same work.

Defendant had the beneflr

assistance of an architect.
All in all the facts are almost identical to the '''
before this Court, as each of the aforesaid facts are true
this case.
According to the Motivated l"fanageme!lt case,

-14-

,, "''d l'untractor can collect for both labor and material
t

':c •,cork is overseen by a licensed contractor.
In the case before this Court, the Special Verdict,

bv the jury, Counsel submits, is dispositive:
(1)
Do you find that the work done by the Plaintiff
on Defendant's cabin was performed by a licensed
contractor or that the work of the employees was
completely supervised by a licensed contractor?
ANSWER

(Yes)YES

NO

This Court has very strongly recognized the right to
trial by jury and the sanctity of their verdicts.
In Efco Distributing, Inc. vs. Perry, 17 Utah 2d 375,
412 P.2d 375, Utah, 1966, the Court stated:
. unless some such error or impropriety as just
stated is clearly sho"m, the verdict of the jury should
stand.
We have heretofore receited the values and the
importance of trial by jury.
It provides a means of
protection of individual rights, and of redress against
any form of injustice, real or imagined, by an appeal
to a group of ordinary citizens as distinguished from
being compelled to submit to any other authority.
This
method of settling disputes is the leaven in our system
of law and justice which keeps it close to the people
who are the ultimate source of power, both in the creation
and in the enforcement of the law.
For these reasons
it is properly regarded an essential ajunct to and in
harmony with, our whole democratic system which the Courts
have taken care and exercised restraint to safeguard.
Consistent with that viewpoint, when the parties
have had the opportunity of presenting their evidence
and arp;urnents concerning their dispute to the jury,
the judgment of the jury should be allowed to swing
through a wide arc within the limits of how reasonable
minds might see the situation;
and the court should
not uoset a verdict merely because it may disagree.
if it did so. the right of trial by jury would be
effectivelv abrogated and the trial may as well be
to the Court in the first place .

It should be noted that the :Jefernhnt ra i scd

1

that the Plaintiff was nnt a licensed contract"r on a
Partial Summary JudgT'lent,

just three davs before the

The Honorable Homer Wilkinson.

tri

District Judge, ar·

concluded, according to the minute entry·

"Court finds •. ··

questions of fact have been raised that are material there:
denies the motion and indicates that trial will take 2
it now being a jury trial,

and it will proceed on schedule

Between the said motion and the trial,
change in the facts.

there was·

Defendants arpued that the Plaintif'.

not a licensed contractor at the time of the contract,

Plain ti ff argued that he had a licensed contractor on sie":
that oversaw the construction of the Defendants cabin
The Special Verdict instruction, was prepared b-,·:
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, again on the basis that a
contractor cornpletelv suoervised the work.
Counsel submits that in light of the Motivated
case, supra,

'ldl'i'

these Defendants Hould have been in no better

of protection had the Plaintiff been licensed, and the j•1·
verdict so holdine should not have been altered bv the C1 1 u::
In conclusion, according to the facts,
filed two liens.

the Plain::

Exhibit 15-P for labor and Exhibit 16-r

materials.
Even assuminf! that the Plaintiff was not
that he is therefore precluded from recovery for his
is no basis to say that he is not entitled to be paid fc•
materials.

-16-

,t

.in J 11 should the Plaintiff be entitled to collect

, r (, c 1 n:;ure basis,

:inJ An unjust enrichment theory.

i

1,'

but he should on a breach of contract
I t should be noted he

ornved, Counsel submits, each theory.

('lea·l

SUMMARY

Counsel submits that Plaintiff should be allowed to

recnver to total amount sued upon on the basis that the Defendants
were acting as their own contractor, and Plaintiff worked for
him.

The fact that the Defendant took out the permit is prima

facia evidence that he was the contractor.

Surely, the Plaintiff

should be able to submit the same to the jury, the trier of fact.
Plaintiff should be allowed to collect on the basis
chat the Defendants were in exactly the same position as they
have been, re:

inept and irresponsible builders, if the

Plaintiff had in fact been licensed.
the Defendants.

There was no exposure to

The only ones who could make claim against the

Defendants would be laborers of the Plaintiff, and the Defendants
could have oaid them upon the return of a Lien Waiver.

This

couoled with the knowledve and experience of the Defendants
outs

is the exact

position as if the Plaintiff had in

been a licensed contractor.
The penalty should fit the offense.
1

f0r

,J•m

According to the

of the Plaintiff, the Defendant enters into an agreement

the construction of his log cabin,

for both labor and materials.

0l'fendants knowino;ly engage the Plaintiff to do the same as an
contractor.

They pay less because of this fact, and

-17-

then refuse payment all together because t 1w
licensed.

l'Lti:

Like one who uses the statute of ft

fraud, Defendants cause a greater harm,
statute was designed to prevent.

t•

than the lin·r"i:.

The injustice perpetra·,

by the Defendants is the most intollerable unjust enric11mr•:r:
Lastly, the Defendants were protected to sarne de?Cc
as they would have been if the Plaintiff was in fact 1 icens•·.
as the jury concluded that the work was completelv super11isc•;
by a licensed contractor.
As a result,

the matter should be reversed and sen:

back to the lower Court with instructions to enter judgment
for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the sum cf
$7,250.00 plus interest and costs and attorneys fees on the
amount of $2, 500. 00 on the has is of either, lien foredosun
breach of contract or unjust enrichment.
In the alternative, the matter should be reversed

d:

set back to the lower Court with instructions to enter j•Jdgr:·
for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the sum ·:·f
$4,831.45 plus interest and costs and attorneys fees in tr.e •
of $2,500.00 on the basis of materials supplied.
Should this Court find that none of the above

rt'•' ..

are appropriate, Counsel submits that this matter shnulJ
versed and remanded to the lower Court, with instri1l'l''''
retry the matter on the basis of the excluded jurv in'
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of June, 1°83
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